Is Jolani’s Reign Nearing Completion, or Will Regional War Keep Him in Power?

We have tagged this article as propaganda as it imposes a serious spin on the topic.
If not more explanation provided, this article is included as propaganda because it shows clear manufacture from a government controlled dialectic, where a topic is misdirected by some actors in order to mislead people during early stages of a narrative.

Updates from Southern Syria — Suwayda Province

A tense ceasefire has been holding in southern Syria since 19 July. However, Suwayda province and the City are under siege. The Al Qaeda regime is trickling aid, food and water to the people of Suwayda. Electricity is barely operating, and the power stations have been deliberately destroyed, along with the water reservoirs. The aid trucks are being intercepted by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) militia and civilians on the trucks are being executed, their bodies left to decompose by the side of the road. I was sepeaking to sources in Suwayda who informed me that the situation is grim — relatively quiet, but they are on constant alert for incursions or artillery attacks. These violations are being downplayed by the Jolani (Ahmed Al Sharaa) regime to avoid further escalation that might endanger his presidency.

According to local sources, more than 36 Druze villages in Suwayda were destroyed and torched during Jolani’s brutal assault. I met with Venezuelan Druze who were evacuated from Suwayda by the Embassy in Lebanon. They confirmed the complete destruction of villages to the west and north of Suwayda City. Hundreds-of-years-old olive groves were burned or uprooted and destroyed by the HTS militia in alliance with Syrian Tribal factions.

Grave atrocities were committed that have irreparably scarred the Druze community. The Syrian Human Rights Center documented 1,677 deaths from all sides due to clashes, summary executions, and Israeli bombardment. However, Suwayda locals testify to far greater numbers massacred by HTS that include babies, children, and entire families killed in the most barbaric ways. There are also reports of mass rape of young women, and the abduction of children and young girls as ‘sex slaves’ for the HTS terrorists. One of the Druze families I met in Lebanon told me that children were plunged into boiling water until they died, and others had their throats cut in front of their parents. Children were held at gunpoint to force their parents to hand over gold and money to the Jolani forces. These stories will never end while Jolani is in power.

The stance of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the Druze spiritual leader, was clear from the outset, opposing HTS’ authority in Damascus, while Sheikh Hammoud al-Hanawi and Sheikh Yusuf al-Jarbou’ initially called for negotiation with them. Yet after the recent events, the three spiritual Druze leaders in Suwayda issued statements that unanimously rejected Jolani’s authority, marking their first united position, openly and unequivocally declaring: there will be no return to negotiation with Damascus.

In a video statement, al-Hanawi said: “We have been afflicted with an authority that has no honor, one that sold the homeland and betrayed its people before betraying its borders. It became a drawn sword over the necks of innocents with extremist ideas that permit the spilling of blood.”

Meanwhile, in another recording, al-Jarbou’ described the events as “sectarian barbarism” amounting to “an attempt at systematic ethnic cleansing”, considering them “a true betrayal of the entire Syrian people that strips this cult of any legitimacy to rule the nation”.

Of course, this barbaric assault was designed to shift the Druze public opinion in favour of Israeli occupation and displays of ‘protection’. To a large degree, it has succeeded. Videos have been circulating on social media showing the Israeli flag being flown in the Suwayda squares alongside the Druze banners. When I speak to friends in Suwayda who have, historically, been enemies of Israel, they tell me that there is no alternative, only starvation and a slow death under siege or massacre.

Axios later reported that Washington is attempting to mediate between Syria and Israel to establish a humanitarian corridor into Suwayda. The ‘New Syria’ regime conveyed its concerns to Washington about the corridor being used to smuggle weapons. This followed Jordan’s refusal to open the As-Sani border crossing with As-Suwayda. Jordan also prevented Israeli aid passing through its territory — forcing Israel to air-drop supplies (using Jordanian airspace, presumably).

It should be understood that HTS has no objection to the Israeli long term objective to extend the land corridor — David’s Corridor — from Israel into Suwayda, passing through Daraa and Quneitra in the south. This territorial gain for Israel will form the bridgehead of the ambitious corridor project linking with the Kurdish-occupied areas east of the River Euphrates in the north.

Are Jolani’s Days Numbered?

On 12 August, Jolani’s Foreign Minister and co-founder of Al Qaeda in Syria, Asaad Al Shaibani, met with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi in Amman. Qatari-funded Syria TV, one of Jolani’s fiercest defenders, reported that Syrian decentralisation topped the agenda of the Amman meeting. Trump’s point man in Syria and the region, Thomas Barrack, attended the meeting in a sombre mood. The following information was supplied to this journalist by reliable sources in Amman:

During the Amman meeting, Al-Safadi told Al-Shaibani: 'You are running out of time, if you don't find a way soon to get along with other Syrian components and reach a political solution, you will face Assad's fate, either politically or by force’.

Al-Shaibani tried to justify what's going on: ‘Mr. Minister, we are a newborn state, and we have severe challenges, everyone is trying to sabotage us, we are trying our best, but our situation is very difficult’.

Safadi's answer was: ‘No one cares any more, Bin Salman has guaranteed you to Trump and got you a meeting with him, now you are embarrassing him and even us, our King is ready to support Syria with everything he can, but you must take actions on the ground, the narrative of unchecked members committing violations will not do any more, seek help and find a solution’.

Shaibani answered: ‘I am going to Turkey tomorrow with the Minister of Defence for this matter, we will ask Turkey for help’.

The severity of the warning to Jolani and his henchmen was further compounded by the UN Security Council’s statement condemning the HTS-led violence in Suwayda and, for the first time, affirming the implementation of a political transition in Syria through Resolution 2254.

Shaibani did indeed rush to Turkey the next day after the Amman meeting to consult with the sponsors of HTS. Ankara’s response was swift. Shaibani met with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. Also present were Murhaf Abu Qasra, Al Qaeda Defence Minister and Hussein Salama, Head of General Intelligence in Damascus. Ankara committed to a ‘military cooperation agreement’ with the Jolani regime. According to a Turkish Defence Ministry source quoted by Reuters, “the memorandum aims to coordinate and plan training and military cooperation, provide advisory support, exchange information and expertise, and ensure the procurement of military equipment, weapons systems, logistical materials, and related services”.

Jolani launched his own ‘charm’ offensive, probably coached by the MI6-linked operatives in Damascus. He met with Greek Orthodox Patriarch John X. Yazigi at the People’s Palace, Damascus. The meeting provided Jolani with the ‘inclusive’ optics, but many on social media pointed out the minor details of ‘disappeared’ Archbishops back in 2013. “Ahmed Al Sharaa, aka Jolani, head of the Syrian terror regime, is responsible for the abduction of the two Orthodox Archbishops of Aleppo: Mor Gregorius Yohanna Ibrahim and Paul Yazigi”. Jolani has never addressed this issue or been pressured to provide information on the Archbishops. 

Jolani is also virtue signalling to senior figures in Idlib that Kurdish leaders had proclaimed readiness to move forward with a deal in March to bring their areas under state authority. If this is true or not remains to be seen, but Jolani is clearly trying to recover his reputation from the stain of the bloodshed in Syria since he came to power. At the same Idlib meeting, Jolani tried again to portray the Druze as ‘seeking Israeli protection and the partitioning of Syria’ — erasing the fact that he issued the commands to HTS militia and the Tribes to massacre the Druze and, now, to starve them into submission.

Is Turkey protecting Jolani from Israel or from his own Takfiri forces? Jolani has no choice but to accept the ‘humanitarian corridor’ in Suwayda. Turkey also has no choice. If Jolani opposes the Israeli-backed corridor, he will have to provide a workable solution from Damascus into Suwayda, which will ignite the fury of the tribal factions he employed to massacre the Druze.

Ankara knows full well that the military options are limited in Syria. Their previous attempts to advance militarily into central Syria were met by Israeli bombardment. Israel will not allow any heavy or advanced weapons to reach Jolani. Turkey will not dare challenge Tel Aviv or Washington over its Syria policy. The most Jolani can expect is light arms for ground fighting or intelligence support, which was already available. This will only keep his more extremist detractors quiet for the short term.

Harnessing the Tribal Forces May Transform into Jolani’s Nemesis

We have gone into detail on the Israeli-Damascus security agreement that was discussed in the Baku meeting back in July. Now, we will examine Jolani’s historical relationship with the Tribes and their relationship with ISIS and the Nusra Front or Al Qaeda in Syria, founded by Jolani and his associates, now in control of Damascus.

The Nusra Front or Jabhat Al Nusra (JAN) first appeared in a tribal region. The town of Al Shahil, east of Deir Ezzor, had a majority of Al Aqidat tribe members. This was the JAN’s first foothold in Syria. Many of the young men had gone to Iraq after the US invasion of 2003. They had joined Takfiri groups in Iraq and then formed the militia of JAN in Syria. Several were promoted to leaders in the ranks of JAN.

Jolani’s ties with the tribes developed after the establishment of JAN and the capture of Raqqa in 2013 by a coalition of Takfiri armed groups. Even back then, JAN was the dominant force in control of Raqqa until disputes arose between Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (Islamic State Iraq) and Jolani. Fierce battles erupted between ISIS, the other factions holding Raqqa, and remnants of the Syrian Arab Army. These battles ended in late 2014, with ISIS taking full control of the province and making it the capital of their intended caliphate in Syria.

One of the main reasons for the defeat of JAN was the defection of many fighters to the ranks of ISIS. JAN lost whole swathes of territory to ISIS during this time as the defectors turned on their former allies. In a single day, ISIS executed 100 members of JAN and Ahrar al-Sham, the latter being a key ally of JAN. Jolani retreated to Idlib, licking his wounds, reorganising his forces, and infiltrating the factions in control there before gradually fighting and subduing them until he gained full control over northwestern Syria — very much with the support of Washington, which ensured the assassination of his opponents in Idlib.

Over time, JAN sought closer strategic ties with the tribes in the region. Jolani recognised them to be a potential manpower resource that he needed for his future campaign to topple the Syrian leadership and armed forces. There was one key figure who was significantly successful in recruitment and forging strong partnerships with tribal leaders: Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, from the al-Jubur tribe that extends from Iraq and Syria to the Gulf. 

Maysar Ali Musa Abdullah al-Juburi (1 June 1976 – 4 April 2024), better known as Abu Mariya Al Qahtani, or al-Harari, after his birthplace, the village of Harara in Iraq, was the architect of Jolani’s tribal relations and his confidant. He was widely considered the second-in-command of JAN due to his influence.

He was dispatched to Syria with Jolani in 2011 by the Islamic State of Iraq and became a member of JAN’s Shura Council. But he was among the fiercest critics of al-Baghdadi and one of the strongest advocates of Jolani’s separation — not only from Baghdadi but also, eventually, from Al Qaeda/JAN itself. Al Qahtani became the Emir of the eastern region, which comprised the tribal recruits who swore loyalty to him. At the time, Jolani appointed him as JAN’s chief religious authority. After JAN’s defeat by ISIS, Jolani sent him to Daraa to attempt to establish a JAN faction in the south, following the collapse of JAN in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa.

Al Qahtani was moderately successful in carving out a zone of influence in southern Daraa (south of Damascus) deploying local tribesmen, but long term he could not sustain it. He faced ongoing battles with ISIS, which also had a presence in the area near the Zionist-occupied Golan. He also faced fierce clashes with the Syrian Arab Army. Eventually, Al Qahtani and his close circle fled to Idlib to continue his work alongside Jolani.

Like all mafia warlords, Jolani knew that Al Qahtani would eventually pose a threat to his leadership. Jolani needed him to recruit and cement relations with the tribes, and so he tactically gave Al Qahtani power within JAN, making him the external security chief who was in charge of liaison with international intelligence agencies.

When Al Qahtani’s influence over-reached the boundaries that Jolani had set, Jolani launched a propaganda campaign against him. On August 14, 2023, the rebranded HTS (formerly JAN) security apparatus arrested Al Qahtani on charges of coordinating with the international coalition. Allegedly, a cell had been captured that identified Al Qahtani. The irony was that it would have been impossible for Al Qahtani to communicate with anyone without Jolani’s knowledge. It was also, supposedly, his job to communicate with foreign entities on behalf of Jolani. His fiercest enemy within HTS was the prominent commander Abu Ahmad Hudoud, now known Anas Khattab, Jolani’s interior minister. He was the mastermind behind Al Qahtani’s arrest and his subsequent assassination on 5 April 2024, in his guesthouse in Sarmada, north of Idlib.

Jolani managed to salvage his reputation by persuading the tribes loyal to Al Qahtani to continue ‘Jihad’ under the JAN/HTS banner. He reinforced his authority over them by executing three people accused of plotting to kill Al Qahtani.

Previously, Jolani had used the tribes against the Syrian Arab Army and the Kurds in northern Syria, attempting to breach the eastern Euphrates region, with Turkish support. But these efforts failed due to Russian air intervention on the one hand, and the determined defence by both the Syrian army and the Kurds, on the other. A Syrian military analyst told me:

Thus, what happened in Suwayda was essentially a repeated experiment — at least from a military standpoint. This time, however, the offensive was on a larger scale, and therefore the losses were greater: at the popular, political, and operational levels alike. The resilience of the Druze of Suwayda in the face of brutal attacks, combined with Israeli air intervention, inflicted clear defeat and heavy losses on the attacking forces.

How Did This Betrayal Impact Jolani’s Relations with the Tribes in 2025?

The strategic failure of the tribal-led military operation in Suwayda and the potential backlash has been a painful blow to Jolani and to the Turkish alliance with HTS. Israel is the only regional player to have benefitted from the operations in tandem with Washington. The tribes have lost what was already a precarious trust in Jolani. Only an estimated 50,000 fighters took part in the attacks on Suwayda, out of the 150,000 that allegedly mobilised. This raises questions over the extent of support that Jolani has on the ground. Without the military hardware destroyed by Israel immediately after the December 2024 coup, Jolani was unable to support the tribes with sufficient logistics and heavy artillery.

The experiment failed militarily and politically, both domestically and internationally. Jolani’s support base is dwindling even among the most devout Sunni Muslim supporters. Jolani rose to power on the wave of Saudi and Qatari media propaganda that ran with the ‘Sunni victimhood’ narratives during the 14-year regime change war. Media outlets like Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera (the articles have since been deleted but were tracked through a Web archive), and trained activists on social media, saturated discourse with claims that the Syrian Arab Army and allies were ‘exterminating’ the Syrian Sunni population. The reality is that the Resistance was against Muslim Brotherhood and Takfiri hordes equipped, sponsored, and armed by the Western alliance. Jolani tried to replicate these narratives against the Alawites being ethnically cleansed on the coast by HTS and against the Druze, portraying the Tribes/Bedouins as victims of Druze attacks, which is a total inversion of reality.

The majority of Syrian Sunni knew this narrative was false. The Syrian Arab Army was a majority Sunni institution. The business class that remained loyal to Syria were Sunni. The huge majority of heads of security, intelligence, and military were Sunni. The claims were farcical, but they stuck among Western populations ignorant of the complexities of Syrian society. After the massacres on the coast and in the south, Syrian Sunnis turned away from Jolani in disgust. This sectarian divide and persecution of minorities has always been rejected by Syria’s diverse and inclusive society. There is also a very real concern that Syrian Sunnis may be tarnished with the Takfiri reputation nationally and internationally if they are seen to condone the crimes being committed since the coup.

Even the staunchest supporters of Jolani, such as Sunni Idlib businessman Ghassan Aboud, has condemned the barbaric campaigns against Syrian minorities. Osama Othman is the executive director of the fraudulent Caesar Files for Justice Organization, which was the primary driver behind drafting the Trump Caesar Sanctions Law. Othman criticised the arbitrary arrests carried out by Jolani’s authority against Syrian citizens and their murder under torture. This vocal opposition from among former allies suggests that there may be a case brought against Jolani in the future to justify his removal.

Syrian Sunnis also fear that they will be targeted once the campaigns against the minorities begin to wane. A group of these tribes attacked a peaceful sit-in in front of the Syrian People’s Assembly, in which demonstrators demanded an end to fighting and bloodshed and called for reconciliation and dialogue among Syrians. People fear speaking publicly about their opposition to Jolani and the Tribal factions that have now flooded Damascus society, but behind closed doors, resentment is smouldering. In the photo below, you can see a gathering of tribesmen in Qassaa, Damascus — a predominantly Christian area of the Old City.

What happened in Suwayda triggered a raft of condemnations from the Western legacy media outlets like Reuters and the BBC that had previously celebrated the Jolani presidency. The tide of popular opinion abroad is turning against Jolani beyond an acceptable tipping point, and his backers in Washington, London, and the EU know they cannot keep him afloat for much longer.

An assessment prepared by the U.S. Department of Defense for members of Congress states that the ‘New Syrian Army’, affiliated with Jolani’s leadership, lacks a coherent regular military structure. Instead, it relies on a fragile and fragmented alliance that includes leaders from ‘Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’ or JAN and other extremist factions, including ISIS. The report says: “Additionally, the government has poor command and control over forces subordinate to the new ministry of defense, including those responsible for atrocities committed against Alawites in Syria’s western coastal areas in March”.

Groups still classified by Washington as terrorist groups such as Hurras Al Din have regained noticeable prominence in Damascus and are shaping the policies of the Jolani regime. This is despite their prior enmity with HTS and Washington’s assassination of their leadership in Idlib.

The report also underlines the Pentagon’s alliance with the Kurdish and former Free Syrian Army elements in Syria under the now-familiar pretext of ‘fighting ISIS’.

Then came the report of the UN Fact-Finding Commission, which — although adopting a moderate tone toward Jolani’s authority — still held it responsible for failing to hold perpetrators of massacres accountable. The report also refuted HTS’ shaky narrative that so-called remnants of the regime were the ones who initiated attacks on their forces, leading to the recriminations against the Alawite minorities. It confirmed ongoing violations, despite the claims by Jolani that his ‘security forces’ were intervening to prevent further bloodshed. The outcome: a state of severe insecurity across the country and a regime out of control of the Takfiri factions now displacing and massacring Syrians from the north to the south.

As a result of this tsunami of bad press, even Ankara will have to reconsider its Syria policy to include a change of regime or decentralisation and partitioning of Syrian territory. Saudi Arabia, as discussed previously, is trying to secure an investment stake in Syria’s future in case Jolani is ousted. Jolani himself has allegedly been siphoning wealth from Syria into Turkey and Cyprus, perhaps in preparation for a change in Washington’s policy towards him. Remember, it was noted that Barrack was not happy in Amman.

A friend in Syria told me that the Jolani sectarian policies are deeply affecting the country (all sources remain anonymous to avoid recriminations. All social media and messaging services are monitored by the Jolani security forces):

The HTS government imposed a new reality in Syria that cannot be reversed or undone. The tradition of peaceful communal coexistence that Syria had long been known for has collapsed, replaced by fear of the other and a lack of trust between the components of society. Minorities can no longer trust the Sunni majority. Some Sunnis support HTS, some are indifferent, and some remain silent out of fear. Sectarian incitement has reached its peak, and no one has been spared, not even moderate Sunnis.

In practice, the first steps toward division have already begun with demands for decentralisation, which will most likely result in federal rule or a clear geographical partition. The problem is that most Syrians live in a state of denial, as if under hypnosis — unable to grasp the scale of the plan, refusing to believe it is being implemented, and failing to form a national consensus that would rise up against the crimes of the de facto authority in Damascus. This environment is not only fertile ground for the resurgence of ISIS, but it may also give rise to new terrorist organisations that could soon emerge on the scene.

A Resurgence of ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and beyond?

Perhaps the most important question, in Syria and the region, is: Where is ISIS?

By following the path of ISIS, it is possible to better understand the threat lies primarily in the ideology that governs the various Western proxy Takfiri and Wahhabi groups. The ideology is not new, nor is it the product of Al Qaeda or the Taliban in Afghanistan. It dates back centuries. In Afghanistan, Washington decided to exploit it against the Soviet Union. In Iraq, the US alliance used it again as a ‘security threat’ to justify US military occupation after 2003. In Syria, the spread of the ideology was ensured by Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi and then Jolani. It is the ideology that should be feared, not the latest brand of terrorist.

This ideology permeates every branch of proxy terrorism, from ISIS to Al Qaeda to JAN, and now HTS. It has outreach agents in almost every country in the West where radicalisation has been a Saudi-led policy in local mosques with UK and EU ‘Takfiris’ heading to Syria to join their ideological brothers. At some point these Takfiri ‘gladio’ cells will erupt in the West just as they have been allowed to flourish in the West Asia region and beyond.

ISIS had seized vast areas of the Syrian desert after the coup in December 2024. They took advantage of the Syrian Arab Army withdrawal from all the checkpoints. What was striking is that ISIS did not launch wide-scale attacks or declare control of key areas in Syria. They preferred to extend their fighters across Syria, exploiting the chaos vacuum left by the arrival of Jolani to Damascus. Perhaps they are adhering to the Rand warfare strategy paper that advocates “swarming” tactics: “Swarming is a military tactic where many small, often autonomous, units converge on a target to overwhelm its defences, create confusion, and achieve a coordinated effect through decentralised, coordinated action rather than a single, large assault”.

ISIS has issued some statements accusing Jolani of betrayal to “two pledges of allegiance” — to Al Baghdadi and to Ayman Al Zawahiri. To date, ISIS has not carried out any significant military or security operations, which may indicate a loss of financial resources and military capabilities. ISIS fighters have been spotted alongside HTS factions during the ethnic cleansing campaigns, or HTS militia are proudly wearing ISIS insignia.

By now, it is indisputable that the US/UK alliance created Al Qaeda, ISIS and JAN, and all other derivatives. These groups serve the Neocon agendas in West Asia. However, as former Syrian President Assad said, “Fighting terrorists is like video game. You can destroy your enemy in the video game, but the video game will generate and regenerate thousands of enemies” and more importantly, in 2013: “It is not possible to put terrorism in your pocket and use it as a card because it is like a scorpion which won't hesitate to sting you at the first opportunity”.

The CIA or MI6 can cut logistical and financial support to these groups, but an ideology can never be eradicated, in fact it spreads. The Takfiri project is still necessary for the US to achieve its foreign policy goals in West Asia. This is why there is a human reservoir of ISIS elements in prisons and camps controlled by the Kurds, funded by the British, in northeastern Syria.

It is currently impossible to know the exact numbers of ISIS inside Syria because many have temporarily gone underground. It is the Hydra of the terrorist proxy world. Cut off one head, and two more grow back. Western populations must be asking themselves, “What happens when their job is done? Will these elements turn on the hand that feeds them?” The likely answer is yes. Can they be contained? No.

It is a recognised fact in this region that ISIS members who escaped to Europe and beyond changed their appearance dramatically and hunkered down in societies they disapprove of. Eventually they will receive orders from the Emir of their sect or group and chaos will be unleashed beyond the boundaries of West Asia. Another analyst in the region sent me this message:

This behaviour is known as Tamkeen in Arabic (empowerment), a jurisprudential fatwa well-known in political Islam, most famously employed by the Muslim Brotherhood. We must understand that the concept of tamkeen is extremely dangerous. Extremist groups use it to infiltrate societies, spread their ideology, then dominate these societies and impose their Sharia. Europeans in particular must be extremely cautious.

A vivid example is the Syrian TikToker Khaled Suleiman, known as ‘Abu Tlaq’, who has been living in the Netherlands for years and hails from tribal roots in Raqqa. He appeared in a video from Sweida carrying an RPG launcher and threatening the Druze. There are hundreds, if not thousands, in Europe who hold the same extremist ideology and have become a danger to European and UK societies. They have quietly infiltrated European societies under the guise of being oppressed refugees fleeing Assad’s ‘barrel bombs’. Looking at Abu Tlaq’s pictures, you see how he adopted Western clothing and lifestyle, but when the moment came, he abandoned everything and joined extremist groups.

Europeans and their UK counterparts are ‘infidels’ in this ISIS ideology. Therefore, theft, slaughter, and the expansion of the Caliphate is permissible under their warped version of Islam. This is the essence of the tamkeen concept. The analyst added:

Early Islamic jurists used the term tamkeen in its general sense: ‘facilitation and the ability to act’. But extremist groups redefined it under what is called the ‘jurisprudence of weakness and empowerment’, dividing it into two stages: the stage of weakness — concealing the call and working in secrecy, and the stage of empowerment — seizing control of a territory or society and imposing Sharia law by force.

The modern theorisation of tamkeen began with Sayyid Qutb and Abul A‘la Maududi in terms of the general idea of a staged process for establishing an Islamic state. They are among the most important ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood and Takfirism. But the version adopted by so-called ‘Jihadist’ groups was later formulated by thinkers such as Abdullah Azzam, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Suri, leaders in Al-Qaeda, culminating in the formulations of the ‘Islamic State’ (ISIS), which again sprouted from Muslim Brotherhood doctrine. Anyone who thinks there is a difference between them, no matter the names, is mistaken.

Until now, ISIS have openly participated in the massacres on the coast and in southern Syria, and we have seen the emergence of the ISIS-linked Ansar Al Sunna, which claimed responsibility for the suicide bomb attack on St Elias Church in Damascus. HTS have been handed power in Syria by the US, UK, Turkey, Israel, and the Arab Gulf States, while upholding a radical Takfiri ideology and sectarian national policy that will alienate all but the most extreme Sunni Muslims or corrupt business class who believe doing business with the devil is the best option available to them.

It is certain that ISIS will be attractive to HTS members who feel betrayed by Jolani’s pivot towards Israel and the West, away from the concept of Syria becoming an Islamist caliphate. At the same time, HTS will try to incentivise stray ISIS members to join the ranks of Jolani’s militia in the war against opponents in Syria and the region, exploiting the ISIS extreme sectarian ideology to target Resistance factions or minorities in Lebanon and Iraq.

With regional war looming on the horizon, will the US-led Zionist alliance keep Jolani in power to harness the Takfiri elements against the regional Resistance forces? Or, will Jolani be kicked out in favour of an alternative US/Israeli-backed transitional coalition focused on fulfilling UN Security Council Resolution 2254? Jolani’s forces have been amassing on the border with eastern Lebanon for the last few days, bringing heavy artillery and armoured vehicles to the area. There is the potential for simultaneous attacks on Lebanon from Israel in the south and the Jolani militia in the east and north.

ISIS cells could be triggered in Iraq against the Resistance factions there and even as far as the borders with Iran through Azerbaijan (the Zangezur Corridor). We don’t yet know the exact trajectory of the escalation, but we do know it is coming, and that Jolani’s role is secured during these battles, so will he orchestrate acceleration (unlikely) to keep himself in power? Or will an acceleration of the Greater Israel project by the Zionist bloc ensure Jolani stays in place until Israel has full spectrum dominance of the region, which is still not assured while the Resistance exists and challenges Zionist hegemony.

Read the full article at the original website

References:

• https://www.syriahr.com/%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%82%D9%80-%D9%80%D8%AA%D9%80/773846/
• https://www.enabbaladi.net/768497/%D8%B4%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AE-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B6/
• https://t.me/KurdishFrontNews/18942
• https://www.axios.com/2025/08/12/israel-syria-corridor-suwayda-tom-barrack
• https://www.reutersconnect.com/item/syrian-foreign-minister-asaad-hassan-al-shibani-meets-with-jordanian-foreign-minister-ayman-safadi-in-amman/dGFnOnJldXRlcnMuY29tLDIwMjU6bmV3c21sX1JDMko1R0EwTURYSg
• https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/64820
• https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/08/1165620
• https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-suriye-arap-cumhuriyeti-disisleri-bakani-savunma-bakani-ve-genel-istihbarat-baskani-ile-gorusmesi--13-08-2025--ankara.en.mfa
• https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-help-syria-with-weapon-systems-equipment-under-new-accord-source-says-2025-08-14/
• https://www.ukcolumn.org/article/the-blair-bush-project-in-syria-that-brought-al-qaeda-to-power
• https://sana.sy/en/?p=369055
• https://x.com/gabrieltrayono/status/1947257045331390928
• https://x.com/trtworld/status/1957149238904648164
• https://x.com/Levant_24_/status/1957389008129933457
• https://www.ukcolumn.org/blogs/the-war-against-the-druze-to-achieve-the-zionist-davids-corridor-in-syria
• https://www.newamerica.org/future-security/reports/how-raqqa-became-capital-isis/executive-summary/
• https://ecfr.eu/archive/page/-/Syrias_uprising_within_an_uprising.pdf
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Maria_al-Qahtani
• https://mei.edu/publications/long-rise-and-sudden-death-jihadist-leader-abu-maria-al-qahtani
• https://syrianjihadism.com/2024/04/20/the-last-days-of-abu-mariyah-al-qahtani/
• https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/top-iraqi-jihadist-killed-suicide-bombing-northwest-syria-2024-04-05/
• https://web.archive.org/web/20160503113551/http:/aawsat.com/home/article/460801/%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%AD%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B8%D9%84%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9
• https://www.alarabiya.net/politics/2014/06/28/%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%91%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AC-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%8B-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8B
• https://www.aljazeera.net/opinions/2014/8/14/%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D8%A3%D9%87%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B0
• https://thewallwillfall.org/2021/10/28/75-years-counting-a-history-of-western-regime-change-in-syria-part-i/
• https://t.me/VanessaBeeley/36865
• https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/07/syrians-in-europe-show-support-for-violence-against-druze-at-home/
• https://www.youtube.com/shorts/fWORjVx5VwE
• https://caesarfiles.org/
• https://www.laprogressive.com/foreign-policy/syria-sanctions
• https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jul/31/2003767903/-1/-1/1/OIR_Q3_JUN2025_FINAL_508.PDF?utm_source=chatgpt.com&fbclid=IwY2xjawMJmL5leHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETEzVzc5V2ZMS0NqelI3SDFIAR5MJvmCkCO2wSC_pFEL_e216bJKGbtVxOv3bfH0KIsgYEaHFAuZ4K8L8XoUhg_aem_H_bPlCl1Zn2IDneIG9GqWg
• https://www.ukcolumn.org/blogs/syria-today-from-the-fall-of-a-centralised-government-to-the-al-qaeda-junta
• https://www.globalresearch.ca/syrian-war-islamic-state-isis-creation-timeline/5472680
• https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/08/un-syria-commission-finds-march-coastal-violence-was-widespread-and
• https://x.com/Syria4Syrians1/status/1957271427574620194
• https://www.ukcolumn.org/article/syria-prey-to-the-globalist-cabal-and-crony-capitalist-al-qaeda-regime
• https://doaj.org/article/075b51cefb1b400e9bb8ef690f340d5d
• https://english.almayadeen.net/articles/analysis/britain--operation-gladio-s-secret--headquarters
• https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1100/RAND_MR1100.pdf
• https://beeley.substack.com/p/western-rampant-hypocrisy-as-they?utm_source=publication-search
• https://www.geenstijl.nl/5184484/nederlandse-syrier
• https://beeley.substack.com/p/barrel-bombs-are-back?utm_source=publication-search
• https://www.alukah.net/sharia/0/38096/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B6%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%88%D9%81%D9%82%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%86/
• https://www.youm7.com/story/2019/8/9/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%C2%AB%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%85%C2%BB-%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%A8/4369058
• https://journals.openedition.org/ema/4384
• https://aawsat.com/home/article/263966/%C2%AB%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4%C2%BB-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A
• https://www.ukcolumn.org/blogs/a-terrorist-suicide-bombing-in-a-damascus-church-triggers-a-wider-takfiri-purge-of-syrian
• https://t.me/enemywatch/40502
• https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2254.pdf